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Abstract 
Purpose – This paper explores the effect of remittances on informal employment in the 
migrants’ countries of origin, looking both at the remittance-receiving and non-migrant 
households. 
Design/methodology/approach – Using data from a large survey conducted in six transition 
economies of Eastern Europe and Central Asia, the determinants of three labour market 
outcomes – not working, working formally and working informally – are estimated in a 
multinomial probit model. The endogeneity of remittances is dealt with instrumental 
variables following the two-stage residual inclusion technique. To assess possible impact of 
remittances on non-migrant households, conditional correlations between the labour market 
outcomes of non-migrant households and the region-level share of remittance receivers are 
obtained.  
Findings – Both correlational and instrumental variable analyses suggest that that receiving 
remittances increases the likelihood of working informally. At the regional level, high 
prevalence of remittances is associated with a higher likelihood of informal work among the 
non-migrant households. Migration and remittances may thus be contributing to informal 
employment in migration-sending countries. 
Research limitations/implications – The empirical analysis is based on cross-sectional data, 
which do not allow isolating the effects of unobserved respondent heterogeneity. To deal with 
this issue, future research could use panel data.    
Originality/value – The study explicitly considers the effects of remittances on formal and 
informal employment of remittances receivers as well as people who do not receive 
remittances. It advances our understanding of what drives informality in developing and 
transition economies.  
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Introduction 
 
International migration and informal employment are salient features of the labour markets 
across the world. It is estimated that 3.2% of the world population live outside their country 
of birth (United Nations, 2013) and a further 13% of the world’s adults would like to 
emigrate (Clifton, 2013). Migrant remittances have been growing steadily over the last 
twenty years, showing resilience to the global economic crisis and reaching US$ 435 billion 
in 2014 (World Bank, 2014). At the same time, 60% of the global workforce do not have 
formal job contracts (OECD, 2009). Both informal employment and remittances are 
important, and controversial, policy variables: despite their ability to alleviate poverty and 
sustain livelihoods for millions of households, informality reduces tax revenues and 
undermines the rule of law, while migration deprives countries of the valuable human capital.  
 
A large literature has shown that remittances can have a significant impact on the labour 
supply of the remittance-recipient household members (see, e.g., Acosta (2007), Airola 
(2008), Jadotte (2009), Kim (2007), Justino and Shemyakina (2012)).  However, little is 
known about the links between remittances and informal employment of remittance 
recipients. While moving abroad and working informally can be viewed as mutually 
exclusive strategies to deal with poverty at the individual level, complex feedback 
mechanisms are likely to exist between the two at the household and community levels. For 
example, remittances may induce remittance receivers to switch from more lucrative but 
insecure informal work to less well-paid but more secure formal work. Remittances can also 
provide the recipients with capital for starting a small business or working as self-employed; 
as self-employment tends to be informal, remittances would encourage informality – both at 
the household and a wider community level. Given the extent and policy relevance of both 
remittances and informal sector, it is important to understand whether remittances encourage 
or discourage informal work among remittance receivers.   
 
This paper explores whether remittances are an important determinant of informal 
employment among (a) remittance-recipients and (b) non-recipients living in areas with high 
incidence of remittances. Geographically, the analysis focuses on the post-socialist 
economies of Eastern Europe and Central Asia. This region is particularly well suited to 
study the links between the two phenomena. Probably nowhere else in the world have the 
3 
 
informal sector and migration grown so rapidly in a relatively short period of time. The 
disintegration of manufacturing industries, trade ties and monetary unions, which followed 
the collapse of the Socialist bloc, provided a fertile ground for the rise of informality; fifteen 
years after fall of communism the informal sector in transition economies was estimated to be 
one third of the gross domestic product – on a par with emerging and developing economies 
(Buehn and Schneider, 2012). Migration and remittances also grew rapidly as the post-
socialist countries opened their borders to the outside world. Currently the countries of the 
region have some of the world’s highest emigration rates and their economies rely 
significantly on migrant remittances.
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The analysis is based on data from the Social Exclusion Survey, conducted in Kazakhstan, 
FYR Macedonia, Moldova, Serbia, Tajikistan and Ukraine in 2009. I estimate the relationship 
between remittances and three labour market outcomes: not working, working formally and 
working informally. Both correlational and instrumental-variable analyses suggest that 
receiving remittances increase the likelihood of informal work. I also find that people from 
non-migrant households are less likely to work formally and more likely to work informally 
if the share of households receiving remittances in a particular region is high.   
 
This study makes a number of contributions to the existing literature on the effects of 
remittances on employment outcomes. First, it explicitly considers the effects of remittances 
on formal and informal work. The literature, reviewed in section two, has so far mostly 
studied the effects of remittances on employment in general, but has not distinguished 
between formal and informal work (an important exception is Abdulloev, Gang and Landon-
Lane (2012), who study the link between remittances and informal activities in Tajikistan). 
Second, the study explores possible effects of remittances on the employment outcomes of 
people who do not receive remittances. The country-level literature (Posso, 2012) has 
suggested community-level effects of remittances on employment of non-migrant 
households. I test whether such links exist at the individual level, paying particular attention 
to informal employment. Third, this paper provides microeconomic evidence on how 
remittances affect labour market outcomes in a multi-country setting. Many micro-studies 
have so far presented one-country evidence, which may limit the generalizability of their 
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 For example, emigrants make up 22-45% of population in Albania, Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
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findings. Finally, this paper advances our understanding of what drives informal employment 
in transition economies and beyond. Besides the classical segmented-labour-market argument 
that informality is driven by the lack of (or difficult access to) formal jobs (Lewis, 1954), 
more recent literature has also emphasised the role of labour market regulation, labour 
income taxation, and social benefit design in driving informality (see, e.g., Lehmann and 
Myravyev, 2014; Koettl and Weber, 2012).
4
 This paper suggests that migration and 
remittances might be contributing to or sustaining informal employment in migration-sending 
countries.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section two reviews the literature and outlines testable 
hypotheses. Sections three presents data and variables. Section four discusses the estimation 
strategy. Section fives presents and discusses the results, followed by conclusions in section 
six.  
 
 
2. Remittances, unemployment and informal work: insights from the literature, theoretical 
channels and hypotheses to be tested 
 
A well-established literature has proposed a number of theoretical channels through which 
remittances can affect the remittance receivers’ participation in the labour market. First, a 
standard Neoclassical argument suggests that remittances raise people’s reservation wages 
and discourage their participation in the labour market (Drinkwater et al., 2009; Justino and 
Shemyakina, 2012). Second, assuming there is a lag between emigration and time when 
remittances start flowing in, the departure of a migrant may force the remaining family 
members to work more to compensate for the lost labour and income (Binzel and Assaad, 
2011; Gagnon and Khoudour-Castéras, 2011). Migrant family members may also choose to 
work more to defray the incurred migration costs (Justino and Shemyakina, 2012; Posso, 
2012).  Third, remittances can help people pay for child and elderly care and enable carers, 
especially women, to participate in the in labour market. However, it can also be argued that 
higher reservation wages resulting from remittances encourage people to switch from waged 
to household work (Gagnon and Khoudour-Castéras, 2011).  Fourth, remittances can provide 
the necessary capital to start a small business or work as self-employed, thus increasing 
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employment in the migrant household and beyond (Posso, 2012); sending a migrant abroad 
can indeed be viewed as a household strategy for raising capital in the presence of imperfect 
credit markets (Stark, 1991). Finally, remittances can encourage the neighbouring non-
migrant households to work more in order to help household members migrate after they 
become aware of the benefits of remittances (Posso, 2012).  
 
These conflicting theoretical channels find reflection in mixed empirical findings. A number 
of household-level studies have shown that the members of remittance-recipient households 
are less likely to work or work less hours than people in similar circumstances but not 
receiving remittances (Acosta, 2007; Airola, 2008; Jadotte, 2009; Kim, 2007; Justino and 
Shemyakina, 2012). Some gender differences have also been found: for example, in Mexico, 
remittances are associated with a lower labour supply of women but not men (Amuedo-
Dorantes and Pozo, 2006; Hanson, 2007). A more mixed picture is obtained at a country 
level. Drinkwater et al. (2009) find an insignificant relationship between unemployment and 
remittances for a panel of 20 countries (where remittances are equivalent to at least 1% of 
GDP). Jackman (2014) obtain an inverted V-shaped relationship between remittances and 
unemployment in Latin American and Caribbean countries: remittances and unemployment 
are correlated positively (negatively) if the remittances-to-GDP ratio is lower (higher) than 
3.25%. Posso (2012) finds that remittances have a positive effect on the labour force 
participation rate in a panel of sixty-six developing countries. This result is supported by the 
household-level study of Piracha et al. (2013), who find that, in Tajikistan, receiving 
remittances lead to increased opportunities of working in own business.   
 
Despite the large body of literature on the effects remittances on employment in general, the 
question of whether remittances affect informal work has received very little attention. 
Abdulloev et al. (2012) represent an important exception. They explore the link between 
participation in informal activities, captured by the gap between reported income (including 
remittances) and reported expenditures, and receiving remittances in Tajikistan. They obtain 
a negative correlation between the two phenomena – the gap between expenditures and 
income is lower for remittance-receiving households – and conclude that remittances and 
informal activities are substitutes. Drawing on the observation that most migrants from 
Tajikistan are low-skilled, Abdulloev et al. (2012) argue that the low skilled people have 
limited opportunities to participate in the lucrative segments of the local informal sector, and 
choose to emigrate instead. The high-skilled, on the contrary, find it more attractive to 
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participate in the domestic informal activities. This explanation lets the skill level to 
determine, prior to migration, whether a person (or members of the same household) will 
migrate or participate in the lucrative segment of the informal market. As such, it does not 
allow some members to migrate and for others to work informally and does not consider 
post-migration feedback effects of remittances on informal employment of those left behind. 
 
Yet, remittances can affect informal employment in a number of ways. First, remittance 
receivers may wish to switch from more lucrative informal jobs to less well-paid formal 
work, but gain in terms of job security and social guarantees. Alternatively, if remittances are 
considered a more efficient and generous safety net relative to the social guarantees of formal 
employment, remittance receivers may choose a more lucrative
5
 but less secure informal 
work.  
 
Second, remittances may provide people with capital for starting a small business or working 
as self-employed. As jobs in small businesses and self-employment tend to be informal, 
remittances will be associated with informality. It is important to note that causality here can 
run both ways: on the one hand, remittances can make stayers consider starting a new 
business or becoming self-employment; on the other, household-level decision to start a new 
business or become self-employed can drive migration and remittances. The new businesses 
channel would also suggest that in localities with a high share of remittance receivers there 
will be many small-scale businesses which will employ more people from the non-migrant 
households. Remittances can thus encourage informal employment beyond the remittance-
receiving household.  
 
Another community-level channel can be formulated along the insights provided by Posso 
(2012). He conjectured that the neighbours of remittance-receiving households may become 
aware of the benefits of remittances and decide to send a member of their household abroad. 
To cover migration costs, these non-migrant households may start working more. Posso 
(2012) used this conjecture to explain why, in developing countries, higher remittances lead 
to higher labour market participation. It could be added that, in order to keep up with the 
consumption levels of the remittance-receiving households, people from non-migrant 
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households may be willing to earn extra cash by increasing their labour marker participation 
at home, i.e., they do not necessarily need to send a migrant abroad. Extending this line of 
reasoning, it can be argued that the ‘neighbours’ effect is particularly likely to encourage 
informal employment. If the objective is to raise a finite sum of money rather than assure a 
continuous income stream, informal work may be a more appropriate option than a longer-
commitment formal work. 
 
Drawing on the theoretical perspectives discussed above, I test two hypotheses:  
 
1) Receiving remittances increases the likelihood of informal employment among the 
members of remittance-receiving household.  
 
2) In a particular locality, a higher share of remittance-receiving households increases 
the likelihood of informal work among people who do not receive remittances.  
 
 
3. Data and variables 
Data 
The data for this study come from a survey administered by the UNDP/UNICEF in six post-
Socialist economies – Kazakhstan, Macedonia, Moldova, Serbia, Tajikistan and Ukraine – in 
November-December 2009. The survey was implemented as part of the preparation of a 
Regional Human Development Report on Social Inclusion for Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia (UNDP, 2011). National samples consist of approximately 2,700 face-to-face interviews 
per country (2,400 in Serbia); there are 15,901 observations altogether. An identical 
questionnaire, translated into local languages and comprising 136 questions, was used in all 
surveyed countries. Multi-stage random sampling was employed to create national samples. 
The primary sampling units were drawn using census, administrative and electoral 
information; subsequently, households were selected via the random route method, and 
respondents within households were selected with the nearest birthday method.
 
The national 
samples are representative of the countries’ age, gender and territorial distributions. Further 
information about survey design, methodology and implementation can be obtained from 
United Nations Development Programme (2011). 
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Variables  
Dependent variable 
To estimate the effects of remittances on informal work, I distinguish between three labour 
market outcomes – 1) not working, 2) having a job with a formal contract and 3) working 
informally – and analyse them in a unified framework. Concentrating only on respondents 
who work (formally and informally) may lead to a selection bias, as the unemployed are 
unlikely to be randomly selected from the population. 
To generate a three-state variable, I use two (nested) questions. First, the respondents were 
asked, “During the last month, have you worked for payment (in cash or in kind) or for any 
other income at least for one day?”  If the answer to this question was affirmative, the 
respondents were asked, “What is your formal status at your current job?” A menu of the 
following answers was offered: 1) working on an unlimited permanent contract, 2) on a fixed 
term contract of less than 12 months, 3) on a fixed term contract of 12 months or more, 4) on 
a temporary employment agency contract, 5) on apprenticeship or other training scheme, and 
6) without a written contract (informal). I use the negative answer to the first question to 
capture not working, then merge answers (1)-(5) to the second question to form a category 
formal work, and use answer (6) to capture informal work.  
Main regressor 
The variable capturing the fact of receiving remittances draws on a question, “Have you or 
someone else in your household received any of the following types of income over the past 
12 months?”, with one of the possible answers being “Help from relatives or friends abroad”.  
12.5% of all respondents reported receiving remittances. There is, however, a large variation 
across countries: the share of remittance-receivers ranges from 2-3% in Kazakhstan and 
Ukraine to 5-8% in Serbia and Macedonia to 26-30% in Moldova and Tajikistan.  
Control variables 
The set of socio-demographic controls includes dichotomous variables for gender, having 
children, six age groups, four education levels (primary, secondary, secondary vocational, 
tertiary), being an ethnic minority, being a student, retired, assisting on a family business, 
four types of settlement (village, small town, economic/regional centre, and capital), as well 
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as variables capturing household income
6
 and self-reported health. To account for all 
country-level effects, which might affect both the labour market outcomes and the flow of 
remittances, I include dummy variables for the six countries.  
 
4. Estimation strategy 
The model to be estimated can be expressed as follows:  
 
Labour Market Statusij = α1*remittancesij +   
         α2*socio-demographic controlsij +  
                α3*country fixed effectsj +  
                       unobserved error termij     (1) 
 
where the dependent variable captures the labour market status (not working, working 
formally and working informally) of individual i living in country j, and α1 through α3 are the 
parameters (parameter vectors) to be estimated. Given the categorical and unordered nature 
of the dependent variable, I estimate the model with multinomial probit.
7
 
The estimation of the effect of remittances on different types of employment is challenging 
due to the potential endogeneity of remittances. Reverse causality is one source of 
endogeneity. People may decide to leave the labour force (e.g. go into education or retire 
early) or work informally (e.g. become self-employed) prior to any emigration decision; 
sending migrants abroad and receiving remittances may be one way to achieve such goals. If 
such reverse causality exists, the evidence based on the correlational analysis would not be 
appropriate for policy advice: for example, a negative association between receiving 
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 The respondents were asked into which of six specified income bands their personal monthly income fell, and 
what was the percentage contribution of their personal income to their total household income. The personal 
income measure was constructed using the income bands’ mid-points (the point for the highest income band was 
linearly projected from the mid-points of the two previous bands). Information on the respondent’s income 
contribution to the total household income was then used to calculate household income, and the OECD 
equivalence scale (first adult=1, other adults=0.5, children=0.3) was used to calculate equivalised household 
income. Finally, for comparability, the equivalised household income was expressed in USD, using the 
Purchasing Power Parity exchange rates for 2009 (source: World Bank, 2012). 
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 As a robustness check, the model was also estimated with the Heckman selection procedure, where, in the first 
stage, individuals choose whether to work or not and, in the second stage, whether to work formally or 
informally. Using subjective health as an identifying variable, the Heckman correction model produced the same 
results as multinomial probit (results are available on request). Given that the Heckman selection model does not 
deal with endogeneity and cannot easily accommodate instrumental variables, I decided to use the multinomial 
probit as the main method of estimation.  
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remittances and informal employment would not necessarily mean that remittances cause 
informal employment. One way to establish the effect of remittances on different types of 
employment is to use instruments – factors which are highly correlated with the likelihood of 
receiving remittances but are independent from, or external to, the employment decision of 
the remittances receiver.  
 
A particular challenge relates to the running of instrumental variable estimation where the 
dependent variable is not continuous. Terza et al. (2008) show that in a non-linear model 
(such as multinomial probit used in this paper) the standard two stage least squares estimation 
will not produce consistent results; instead, they recommend using a two-stage-residual-
inclusion (2RSI) estimation which will produce consistent results. The idea of the 2SRI 
estimation is to run a standard first stage regression, where a potentially endogenous 
regressor (receiving remittances) is explained by the instruments and control variables, and to 
include the predicted 1
st
 stage residuals, alongside the endogenous regressor, into the second 
stage equation.
8
 The estimated coefficient of the endogenous regressor in the second stage 
represents the unbiased effect of remittances on the three-state labour market outcome, while 
the coefficient of the predicted residuals captures the endogeneity bias. Formally, the 2SRI 
procedure can be expressed as follows:   
First stage:      REMITi = β1*INSTRi + β2*Xi + ui    (2) 
Second stage:    LMSi = γ1*REMITi + γ2*ui
est
 + γ3 *Xi + εi     (3) 
where, for each individual i, REMIT is a variable capturing the fact of receiving remittances, 
INSTR is a set of instrumental variables, LMS is a three-state variable capturing labour 
market status, X is a vector of socio-demographic characteristics and country-fixed effects, u 
is the error term of the first-stage regression, u
est
 is the predicted residual from the first-stage 
equation, and ε is the error term in the second-stage regression.  
An advantage of the 2RSI estimation is that the coefficient of the predicted residuals γ2 
represents a direct test for the exogeneity of the regressor of interest (Bollen et al. 1995). If it 
is not statistically different from 0, one accepts the null hypothesis that the regressor is 
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exogenous and the model should be estimated by a non-linear regression (in our case, 
multinomial probit). 
 
Instruments 
To be valid, instruments must be highly correlated with the endogenous regressor (instrument 
relevance) and should not have a direct influence, apart from the influence through the 
endogenous regressor, on the dependent variable (instrument exogeneity). The first 
instrument candidate is based on the question, “Some 25 years ago, did your household meet 
its needs for food by growing vegetables or fruits or keeping poultry or livestock?”, with 
possible answers “No, not at all”, “Yes, for up to one-tenth of the household’s food needs”, 
“Yes, for between one-tenth and a half of household’s food need” and “Yes, for half or more 
of the household’s needs”. Growing vegetables/ fruits or keeping poultry in 1985 (before the 
collapse of socialism) would indicate that households faced hardships in meeting their food 
needs using income from employment. It also could indicate that such households were 
successful in diversifying their sources of income (or, more precisely, sources of food).  
 
Arguably, the relative poverty in 1985 positively affected the likelihood of emigration and 
receiving remittances after the fall of socialism. The ability and experience of diversification 
of income/ food sources could also be important for migration. Sending some family 
members abroad and receiving remittances is often viewed as a strategy to hedge against risks 
facing households and smooth consumption in case of shocks (Stark and Bloom, 1985, Stark, 
2009). If household strategies of income diversification persist over time, those households 
which used to diversify food supply (through subsistence agriculture) before the fall of 
socialism would also be more likely to diversify the sources of income (through migration) 
25 years later. 
 
Overall, 33% of respondents said their households were not involved in subsistence 
agriculture; this share ranges from 27% in Moldova to 47% in Macedonia. I create a dummy 
variable subsistence agriculture equal to 1 if, in the mid-1980s, a household was involved in 
subsistence agriculture (regardless of the percentage of household food needs that it was 
meeting) and 0 otherwise. I expect this variable to correlate positively with the likelihood of 
receiving remittances.  
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The second instrument candidate relates to the level of ethnic diversity in the settlement 
where the respondent lives. There exists a large literature linking diversity and socio-
economic outcomes; one part of this literature suggests that ethnic and linguistic diversity, 
especially at the country level, is associated with inferior outcomes – lower GDP growth, 
lower literacy rate, lower investment, lower provision of public goods, less political freedom, 
higher infant mortality, higher extent of corruption and higher incidence of civil conflicts 
(Alesina et al., 2003; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005; 
Miguel and Gugerty, 2005), while other contributions show that the role of ethnic 
fractionalisation positive (Gisselquist et al., 2016) or insignificant (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). 
Through its effect of socio-economic outcomes, ethnic diversity could also be a driver of 
emigration and remittances – both for the ethnic majority and minority; there would be more 
(less) migration if ethnic diversity leads to inferior (superior) socio-economic outcomes. In 
addition, there is also theoretical and empirical literature suggesting that, for various reasons, 
the ethnic minorities have higher willingness to migrate compared to the ethnic majority 
(Ivlevs, 2013; Pichler, 2009; Docquier and Rapoport, 2003; Hughes, 2005). One could, 
therefore, expect that, at the local level, people finding themselves in a minority position 
(even if they belong to the majority at country level) would be more likely to migrate – and 
send remittances back home. 
 
To capture the settlement-level ethnic diversity, as well as the respondent’s minority status 
within a settlement, I use information that the interviewers (and not the interviewees) had to 
provide about the share of the respondent’s ethnic group in the settlement, by choosing one of 
the following bands: “less than 10%”, “10-20%”, “20-40%”, “40-60%”, “60-80%” and “more 
than 80%”.9 Using this information, I create two dummy variables: 1) ethnically mixed 
settlements, which equals one if the share of the respondent’s ethnic group is 40-60%, and 2) 
a within-settlement minority, which equals 1 if any of the first three bands was chosen (i.e., 
the respondent belongs to an ethnic group which makes up less than 40% of the settlement 
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 One can be very critical about how precise the interviewer’s estimates about the share of the respondent’s 
ethnic group in the settlement are. It is not clear what such information would be based on (observation, prior 
knowledge) and whether there would exist official statistics (at the settlement level) for the interviewers to refer 
to and/or to verify the information they provide. However, one could argue that interviewers would provide less 
biased and more precise information about ethnic shares than the interviewees (who would probably want to 
overestimate the share of their ethnic group). Overall, I believe that, despite being subjective and potentially 
imprecise, the information on the share of respondent’s ethnic group in the settlement is unique and insightful, 
and I make use of it in the analysis.  
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population). It is a priori unclear whether ethnically mixed settlements is associated with the 
likelihood of receiving remittances positively or negatively, while within-settlement minority 
is expected to be associated with the endogenous regressor positively.   
 
I will check whether the instruments are relevant by testing for joint significance of the 
instruments in the first stage regression.  F-statistic higher than the commonly accepted 
threshold of 10 would indicate that the instruments are sufficiently good predictors of 
remittances. In addition, I expect the three instruments to be individually statistically 
significant in the first stage regression. Instrument exogeneity in a 2SRI estimation can be 
tested by including all but one instrument in the second stage equation (which contains the 
predicted residuals, the endogenous regressor and controls). The joint insignificance of the 
included instruments indicates that they are exogenous (Bollen et al., 1995).
10
 
 
5. RESULTS 
5.1. Remittances and the labour market status of remittances receivers  
Table 1 shows the results of a multinomial probit estimation which does not account for the 
endogeneity of remittances. To facilitate result interpretation, I report the (average) marginal 
effects. The results suggest that, controlling for other factors, people from remittance-
receiving households are 4.3 percentage more likely to be not working, 5.9 percentage points 
less likely to be employed formally and 1.6 percentage points more likely to be employed 
informally. The magnitude of these estimates is non-negligible relative to the average 
incidence of the three labour market outcomes (54.8, 37 and 8.2%, respectively); the results 
thus suggest that remittance receipt is associated with a 19.5% increase in the likelihood of 
informal employment relative to the sample average.  
Concerning other variables, men, younger people, people with lower levels of education, 
those assisting in family business, linguistic minorities and village-dwellers are more likely to 
say they are employed informally. Formal work is more prevalent among men, people in the 
middle of the age distribution, better educated and people with higher incomes. Finally, 
women, both younger and older people, people with lower levels of education and income, 
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students, the retired, those assisting on a family business, the least healthy and people from 
rural areas are more likely to say that they do not work.  
Table 2 reports the marginal effect of the variable of interest (receiving remittances) when the 
model is estimated for each of the six countries. Similar to the whole-sample result, there is a 
tendency for the marginal effect to be positive on the informal work and out of labour force 
outcomes and negative on the formal work outcome.   However, the magnitude and statistical 
significance of the results differs across countries. Receiving remittances has a statistically 
significant association with working informally only in Tajikistan, where members of 
remittances-receiving households are 2.7 percentage points more likely to work informally. 
Remittances are associated with a lower likelihood of formal work in Moldova, Tajikistan 
and Ukraine (the marginal effects range from 3.7 to 10.4 percentage points) and a higher 
likelihood of not working in Moldova and  Ukraine (the marginal effects are 7 and 9.8 
percentage points). Noteworthy, the whole-sample results are, to a large extent, driven by 
countries which depend most on remittances (Tajikistan and Moldova).   
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Table 1. Receiving remittances and labour market outcomes: multinomial probit marginal 
effects 
 Not working Formal work Informal work 
    
Receives remittances 0.043*** -0.059*** 0.016** 
Female 0.077*** -0.026*** -0.052*** 
Has child(ren) -0.011 0.002 0.008 
Age    
18-24 0.130*** -0.129*** -0.001 
25-34 0.066*** -0.059*** -0.007 
35-44 Ref. Ref. Ref. 
45-54 0.011 0.005 -0.016** 
55-64 0.033** -0.004 -0.029*** 
65+ 0.164*** -0.130*** -0.034** 
Education    
Primary 0.046*** -0.053*** 0.007 
Secondary Ref. Ref. Ref. 
Vocational -0.052*** 0.054*** -0.002 
Tertiary -0.065*** 0.092*** -0.027*** 
Student 0.286*** -0.250*** -0.036*** 
Retired 0.519*** -0.477*** -0.042*** 
Assisting in family business 0.089*** -0.153*** 0.064*** 
Linguistic minority -0.014** -0.005 0.019*** 
Income/10 -0.005*** 0.004*** 0.001*** 
Poor health 0.027*** -0.030*** 0.004 
Type of settlement    
Village  0.015* -0.030*** 0.014** 
Small town Ref. Ref. Ref. 
Regional centre 0.017 -0.018* 0.001 
Capital  -0.008 0.003 0.005 
Country    
Ukraine Ref. Ref. Ref. 
Tajikistan  0.151*** -0.170*** 0.019** 
Serbia  0.152*** -0.071*** -0.081*** 
Macedonia  0.210*** -0.148*** -0.062*** 
Moldova  0.057*** -0.035*** -0.022** 
Kazakhstan  0.081*** -0.084*** 0.003 
    
Observations  14,310  
Wald Chi
2
  3029  
Prob > Chi
2
  0.000  
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors used to calculate the regressors’ level of 
significance. Average marginal effects.  
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Table 2. Receiving remittances and labour market outcomes by country, multinomial probit 
marginal effects 
 Not working Formal work Informal work 
    
FYR of Macedonia 0.033 -0.021 -0.012 
Moldova 0.070*** -0.074*** 0.004 
Kazakhstan -0.000 -0.019 0.020 
Serbia 0.009 -0.021 0.013 
Tajikistan 0.010 -0.037** 0.027** 
Ukraine 0.098** -0.104* 0.006 
 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors used to calculate the regressors’ level of 
significance. Each line reports the average marginal effects of the remittances variable from a model estimated 
for a particular country. The same socio-demographic controls as in Table 1 are included in all regressions; their 
marginal effects are not reported to save space. Sample size for the six estimations ranges from 2,187 to 2,533. 
In all regressions, the Wald test rejects (p=0.000) the hypothesis that all regressors are equal to 0. Complete 
econometric output is available on request.  
 
The results reported in Tables 1 and 2 are best described as conditional correlations. There is 
no guarantee that they represent the effect of receiving remittances on different labour market 
outcomes. As argued earlier, households may send migrants abroad with an expectation of 
receiving remittances and either exiting the labour force or moving into the informal sector at 
a later stage. The decision to migrate and send remittances back home can, thus, be a 
consequence, and not a cause, of the decision of some household members to change their 
labour market status. In addition, unobserved household characteristics may push some 
members of a household into unemployment/ informality at home and others into migration.  
To correct for the potential endogeneity of remittances, I perform instrumental variable 
(2SRI) analysis. The results of the first stage regression are reported in the first column of 
Table 3. All three instruments are highly significant. As expected, within-settlement ethnic 
minority respondents and households which were engaged in subsistence agriculture in 1985 
are more likely to receive remittances; furthermore, respondents living in ethnically mixed 
settlements are also more likely to receive remittances. The instruments jointly satisfy the 
relevance condition, with the value of the F test of excluded instruments equal to 28.01. The 
validity of the instruments is further confirmed by the overidentification test which rejects the 
hypothesis that instruments are endogenous (p = 0.145).   
Columns 2-4 of table 2 show the results of the 2SRI second stage equation, which includes 
the first stage predicted residuals alongside the endogenous regressor and control variables. 
The statistically significant coefficient of the predicted residuals for the unemployed and 
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informal-work outcomes indicates that the endogeneity is present in the model and the 2SRI 
results should be used. The instrumental variable results suggest receiving remittances 
reduces the likelihood the of being out of labour force by 30 percentage points, does not have 
a significant effect on the likelihood of being employed formally and increases the 
probability of informal employment by 18 percentage points. It thus appears that remittances 
encourage people to move from labour market inactivity into informal employment.  
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Table 3. Receiving remittances and labour market outcomes: 2SRI multinomial probit first 
stage results and second stage marginal effects 
 
1
st
 stage 
2
nd
 stage 2SRI average marginal effects 
 Not  
working 
Formal  
work 
Informal  
work 
Receives remittances  Dep.var. -0.303** 0.123 0.180* 
1
st
 stage predicted residuals - 0.348*** -0.183 -0.165* 
Female 0.027*** 0.087*** -0.030*** -0.056*** 
Has child(ren) 0.021*** -0.003 -0.001 0.005 
Age     
18-24 0.027** 0.139*** -0.134*** -0.005 
25-34 0.017** 0.072*** -0.062*** -0.010 
35-44 Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
45-54 0.025*** 0.020** -0.000 -0.020*** 
55-64 0.031*** 0.044*** -0.009 -0.034*** 
65+ 0.015 0.170*** -0.133*** -0.037** 
Education     
Primary -0.021*** 0.039*** -0.049*** 0.010 
Secondary Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
Vocational -0.021*** -0.059*** 0.057*** 0.002 
Tertiary -0.028*** -0.075*** 0.097*** -0.022*** 
Student 0.023 0.293*** -0.254*** -0.039*** 
Retired -0.002 0.518*** -0.476*** -0.041*** 
Assisting in family business -0.017 0.083*** -0.150*** 0.067*** 
Linguistic minority -0.008 -0.012* -0.007 0.018*** 
Income/10 0.000 -0.005*** 0.004*** 0.001*** 
Poor health -0.011*** 0.023*** -0.028*** 0.005** 
Type of settlement     
Village  0.029*** 0.026*** -0.035*** 0.009 
Small town Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
Regional centre 0.021*** 0.023** -0.021** -0.002 
Capital  -0.034*** -0.022* 0.011 0.012 
Country     
Ukraine Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
Tajikistan  0.250*** 0.239*** -0.216*** -0.023 
Serbia  0.016** 0.157*** -0.073*** -0.083*** 
Macedonia  0.052*** 0.225*** -0.156*** -0.070*** 
Moldova  0.224*** 0.134*** -0.075** -0.059*** 
Kazakhstan  -0.028*** 0.076*** -0.081*** 0.006 
     
Instruments     
Within-settlement minority 0.050***    
Ethnically mixed settlement 0.037***    
Subsistence agriculture in 1985 0.034***    
F test of excluded instruments 28.01***    
Overidentification test 0.145    
     
Observations  14,310   
Wald Chi
2
  3031   
Prob > Chi
2
  0.000   
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors used to calculate the regressors’ level of 
significance. Average marginal effects.  
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5.2. Remittances and labour market outcomes of non-migrant households 
 
Do remittances encourage informal employment among the non-migrant households? One 
way to shed light on this question is to relate the regional variation in the share of remittance-
receivers to labour market outcomes of people who do not receive remittances. Table 4 
reports conditional correlations between the region-level share of households receiving 
remittances (the share of remittance receivers in a region is on average 12.7%, ranging from 
0% to 91.7%)
11
 and the probability of not working, working formally and working informally 
for people who do not receive remittances (remittances receivers are excluded from analysis).  
The results for the six-country sample, and the corresponding predicted probabilities (Figure 
1), suggest that, among people who do not receive remittances, higher region-level remittance 
intensity is associated with a higher likelihood of working informally and a lower likelihood 
of working formally; the likelihood of ‘not working’ is not significantly correlated with the 
regional share of remittance receivers. In terms of magnitudes, an increase in the district-level 
share of remittance receivers by 10 percentage points is associated with a 1.35 percentage 
points higher probability of working informally (3.65% increase relative to the average 
incidence of informal work) and an approximately 1.61 percentage points lower probability 
of working formally (2.94% decrease relative to the average incidence of formal work).  
Table 5 reports the results of the model estimated for each of the six countries. The marginal 
effect for the informal work outcome is positive in all six countries and statistically 
significant in three: Macedonia, Serbia and Tajikistan. The marginal effects for the formal 
work outcome tend to be negative, but are statistically significant only in Serbia.  
It should be noted that correlational results shown in Tables 4 and 5 do not necessarily 
represent the effect of remittances on the labour market outcomes of non-migrant households. 
Reverse causality is possible as people may wish to emigrate (and send remittances back 
home) if informal employment is widespread in their region. Another source of endogeneity 
is omitted variables affecting both the local-level emigration and informal employment. 
Dealing with the potential endogeneity and establishing causal effects of remittances on the 
                                                          
11
 The total number of regions/districts in six countries is 208 (on average 35 per country). The share is 
calculated by dividing the number of remittances receiving households by the total number of households in a 
region.  
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informal employment of non-migrant households is beyond the scope of this study and 
represents an important direction for future research.  
 
Table 4. Region-level share of remittance receivers and labour market outcomes of people 
not receiving remittances. Multinomial probit average marginal effects 
 Not  
working 
Formal  
work 
Informal  
work 
    
Share of remittance receivers in a region  (0 to 1) 0.026 -0.161*** 0.135*** 
Female 0.068*** -0.024*** -0.044*** 
Has child(ren) -0.005 0.003 0.003 
Age    
18-24 0.126*** -0.136*** 0.010 
25-34 0.070*** -0.066*** -0.005 
35-44 Ref. Ref. Ref. 
45-54 0.015 0.003 -0.018*** 
55-64 0.039** -0.009 -0.030*** 
65+ 0.164*** -0.133*** -0.031* 
Education    
Primary 0.044*** -0.057*** 0.013 
Secondary Ref. Ref. Ref. 
Vocational -0.054*** 0.054*** -0.000 
Tertiary -0.059*** 0.082*** -0.023*** 
Student 0.288*** -0.263*** -0.025* 
Retired 0.506*** -0.482*** -0.024 
Assisting in family business 0.068* -0.147*** 0.079*** 
Linguistic minority -0.012 -0.007 0.020*** 
Income/10 -0.004*** 0.004*** 0.000*** 
Poor health 0.030*** -0.035*** 0.005* 
Type of settlement    
Village  0.027** -0.040*** 0.013* 
Small town Ref. Ref. Ref. 
Regional centre 0.018 -0.021 0.003 
Capital  -0.011 -0.005 0.015 
Country    
Ukraine Ref. Ref. Ref. 
Tajikistan  0.163*** -0.142*** -0.021 
Serbia  0.158*** -0.077*** -0.081*** 
Macedonia  0.211*** -0.147*** -0.065*** 
Moldova  0.055*** 0.005 -0.060*** 
Kazakhstan  0.088*** -0.087*** -0.001 
    
Observations 12,494 12,494 12,494 
Wald Chi
2
 2949.51   
Prob > Chi
2
 0.000   
 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors, clustered at the region level, used to calculate the 
regressors’ level of significance. Average marginal effects. The regression excludes people who do not receive 
remittances. The regional share of remittances receivers varies from 0 (0%) to 0.92 (92%).   
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Figure 1. Predicted probabilities of working informally, working formally and not working 
among people who do not receive remittances, as a function of the regional share of 
remittance receivers  
 
 
Table 5. Region-level share of remittance receivers and labour market outcomes of people 
not receiving remittances, by country. Multinomial probit average marginal effects 
 Not working Formal work Informal work 
    
FYR of Macedonia -0.182 -0.007 0.189** 
Moldova 0.093 -0.132 0.039 
Kazakhstan 0.559 -0.592 0.033 
Serbia 0.234 -0.467** 0.233*** 
Tajikistan -0.116 -0.034 0.150** 
Ukraine -0.127 0.008 0.119 
 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors, clustered at the region level, used to calculate the 
regressors’ level of significance.Each line reports the average marginal effects of the regional share of 
remittance receivers variable from a model estimated for a particular country. The same socio-demographic 
controls as in Table 4 are included in all regressions; their marginal effects are not reported to space. Sample 
size for the six estimations ranges from 1,734 to 2,474 (regressions excluded people who receive remittances). 
Complete econometric output is available on request.  
 
6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This paper has studied the effects of receiving migrant remittances on the likelihood of 
informal work among the members of the remittance-recipient households, as well as the 
local-level effects of remittances on the likelihood of informal work among the non-migrant 
households. Using a large survey from six transition economies, I found that people receiving 
remittances are more likely to work informally than people with similar characteristics but 
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not receiving remittances. The instrumental variable analysis confirmed that remittances have 
a positive effect on informal employment. Two explanations for this finding are: 1) 
remittances provide the household with a capital to start a new business or become self-
employed - a type of employment which is often informal – and 2) remittances represent a 
safety net encouraging remittance-receivers to choose less secure, but often more lucrative, 
informal work.   
I also obtained a positive and significant district-level association between the share of 
remittance-receivers and the likelihood of working informally among people who do not 
receive remittances. One possible explanation is the ‘new businesses’ effect:  remittances 
encourage the formation of small enterprises which informally employ local people who do 
not receive remittances. Another explanation is the ‘neighbours’ effect: the non-migrant 
households want to keep up with the consumption levels of the remittance-receiving 
neighbours and, to raise the money, may decide either work more or to send a migrant 
abroad. Working informally is a quick way to raise money directly or to cover migration 
costs.    
The analysis conducted at the county level reveals that, among the six transition economies, 
Tajikistan is the only country where remittances encouraged informal employment of both 
migrant and non-migrant households. It is important to compare this finding with Abdulloev 
et al. (2012) – the only other study exploring the links between migration and informality, 
and doing so using data from Tajikistan. Abdulloev et al. (2012) argue that migration and 
informal activities are substitutes: the low-skilled people in Tajikistan choose to migrate 
while the high-skilled people choose to work in the lucrative (upper-tier) segment of the local 
informal economy. The authors support this conjecture by the empirical finding that 
remittance-receiving households have a lower gap between reported expenditures and 
reported income (a proxy for being involved in informal activities) than the non-migrant 
households. At first view, the results of Abdulloev at al. (2012) may seem in conflict with the 
results of our study. However, a closer inspection of the definitions of informality may help 
reconcile the results of the two papers. As in many other parts of the post-socialist world, 
Tajik people working in the lucrative segment of the local informal economy are likely to be 
paid a minimum declared wage, for which they will have a formal work contract; the 
remainder of the wage, probably its biggest part, is likely to be paid in the ‘envelope’, i.e. 
undeclared to the state (see e.g. Williams (2009)).  In Abdulloev et al. (2012) the receivers of 
‘envelope’ wages would be considered informal workers, as their reported expenditures 
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exceed reported income, but in our analysis they are likely to be formal (i.e., they would 
answer ‘yes’ to the  question, “Do you have a formal contract in your main job?”). In 
contrast, people who do not have a formal contract in their main job (‘informal work’ in this 
paper) are likely to be employed in the lower-tier informal sector (small firms, family 
businesses, self-employed), receive a relatively low wage and, possibly, have a lower gap 
between reported expenditures and income (i.e. less likely to be involved in informal 
activities according to the definition of informality adopted by Abdulloev at al. (2012)). So, 
whether remittances and informality are substitutes or complements may depend on whether 
one considers the upper or the lower tier of the informal market. In this paper, I have used the 
‘formal work contract’ definition of informality and most likely captured the lower tier of the 
informal market. The analysis of richer data, allowing to distinguish the receivers of 
‘envelope’ wages from people whose entire wage is undeclared, would provide a more 
nuanced picture of the effects of remittances on informal employment and represents another 
direction for future research.  
Overall, the results of this paper suggest that remittances are either associated with or lead to 
more informality in the sending countries. This finding makes remittances a controversial 
policy instrument: while informal work represents an efficient way to deal with poverty in the 
short term, extensive informal sector results in low fiscal capacity of the state and low trust in 
state institutions, which undermines development in the long term.   
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Appendix.  
Summary statistics 
 Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Min Max 
Labour market status     
Working formally 0.548 0.498 0 1 
Working informally  0.370 0.483 0 1 
Not working  0.082 0.274 0 1 
Households receives remittances 0.127 0.333 0 1 
Share of remittance receivers in a region 0.127 0.160 0 0.917 
Female 0.545 0.498 0 1 
Has child(ren) 0.462 0.499 0 1 
Age     
18-24 0.179 0.383 0 1 
25-34 0.194 0.396 0 1 
35-44 0.186 0.389 0 1 
45-54 0.171 0.377 0 1 
55-64 0.132 0.338 0 1 
65+ 0.139 0.346 0 1 
Education     
Primary 0.238 0.426 0 1 
Secondary 0.408 0.491 0 1 
Vocational 0.169 0.375 0 1 
Tertiary 0.185 0.389 0 1 
Student 0.080 0.271 0 1 
Retired 0.203 0.402 0 1 
Assisting in family business 0.017 0.128 0 1 
Linguistic minority 0.309 0.462 0 1 
Equivalised household income (PPP USD) 302.60 365.91 0 5032.63 
Poor health (high = less healthy) 3.155 1.118 1 5 
Type of settlement     
Village  0.488 0.500 0 1 
Small town 0.188 0.391 0 1 
Regional centre 0.197 0.398 0 1 
Capital  0.126 0.332 0 1 
Within-settlement minority 0.167 0.373 0 1 
Ethnically-mixed settlement 0.144 0.351 0 1 
Subsistence agriculture in 1985 0.340 0.474 0 1 
 
 
